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4.1  Introduction 
The surge of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) after the  1985 
Plaza Accords has been well documented and extensively studied. Direct 
investment by Japanese firms in the U.S. manufacturing sector was an im- 
portant part of this total movement of capital abroad, as figure 4.1 indi- 
cates. While Japanese aggregate FDI statistics contain some well-known 
flaws, these figures nevertheless indicate that in 1989 some $33.9 billion of 
total FDI flowed into the United States from Japan, representing about 
50 percent of total Japanese FDI.’ Of this total inflow into the United 
States, approximately $24.3 billion consisted of direct investment outside 
of the manufacturing sector (much of it in finance and real estate), while 
the remaining $9.6 billion consisted of direct investment in manufacturing. 
While  such  high-profile nonmanufacturing  acquisitions  as  Rockefeller 
Center, Pebble Beach, and Columbia Pictures received much media atten- 
tion, it is worth pointing out that, in aggregate, Japanese firms’ total man- 
ufacturing investments in the United States exceeded, in dollar terms, their 
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Fig. 4.1  Japanese manufacturing FDI 
Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho (Tokyo, various is- 
sues). 
direct investments in manufacturing in Asia until 1994. Both kinds of FDI 
raised concerns in the United States, where, prior to the 1980s, foreign- 
owned firms had played a relatively small role in the economy. Neverthe- 
less, even at the height of Japanese investment in the United States, Japa- 
nese purchases of “trophy” real estate properties raised less concern than 
Japanese investments in U.S. manufacturing, particularly the acquisition 
of existing U.S. firms in industries where the United States was perceived 
to maintain a competitive advantage. 
These concerns were partly motivated by the perception, correct or not, 
that U.S. investment in Japan was more difficult than Japanese investment 
in the United States. However, for many in and out of government who 
worried about the “competitiveness” of U.S. industries in the late 1980s, 
the real source of unease was the belief that by being more geographically 
proximate to the headquarters, manufacturing plants, and R&D facilities 
of their U.S. competitors (and, in some cases, owning these assets outright 
through  acquisition)  Japanese  firms would  be  able to  “tap into” U.S. 
sources of technological strength, further eroding US. competitive advan- 
tages in the few industries and industry segments where the United States 
was perceived to maintain such strength.2 
While the subsequent revival of American high-tech manufacturing and 
2. The anxious mood of the times was well captured in the title of one academic volume 
published in  1989 by  the Society for Japanese Studies, Japanese Investment  in  the  United 
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the well-publicized problems of Japanese companies have taken these is- 
sues off the policy agenda, it is still an open empirical question whether 
Japanese FDI increased the ability of Japanese firms to learn from the 
research activities and technological strengths of U.S. firms. The idea that 
tapping foreign sources of technological strength through FDI and acqui- 
sition could be a profitable corporate strategy has received strong support 
from one of the world’s best-known corporate strategy experts, Michael 
Porter, in his best-selling 1990 book,  The Competitive Advantage  of  Na- 
tions. Porter provides little in the way of quantitative empirical evidence to 
support his claim that foreign knowledge and expertise can be effectively 
“siphoned” through judicious FDI. However, he buttresses his plausible 
argument with some fascinating “case st~dies.”~ 
This idea has also received both renewed interest and qualified support 
from the expanding theoretical and empirical economic literature on inter- 
national R&D spillovers and the channels by  which they are mediated. 
Since the theoretical  work of Grossman and Helpman emphasized the 
potential importance of both intranational and international R&D spill- 
overs in models of trade and growth, a number of  researchers have at- 
tempted to both quantify the importance of international R&D spillovers 
and investigate the means by which they are mediated. Early work by Coe 
and Helpman (1995), using aggregate data for a set of advanced econo- 
mies, claimed that R&D spillovers were mediated through trade and that 
the effects were quite strong. Eaton and Kortum (1996), examining the re- 
lated concept of technology transfer, found suggestive evidence of signifi- 
cant knowledge flows across countries. More recent work by Keller (1998) 
at the aggregated industry level qualified both the importance of these 
spillovers and the extent to which they  are actually mediated  through 
trade. Branstetter (forthcoming), who examined international and intra- 
national spillovers at the firm level in the United States and Japan, found 
striking evidence that R&D spillovers are primarily an intranational phe- 
nomenon. Despite its obvious potential importance as a means of mediat- 
ing knowledge flows, comparatively little empirical analysis has been con- 
ducted on FDI and the role it may play as a channel of R&D spillovers. 
This gap in the literature is mirrored by a similar gap in the now rather 
voluminous literature on the benefits of  “outward-oriented’’ economic 
policies. Many scholars have asserted that exports are likely to have im- 
portant effects on economic growth due to the “knowledge spillovers” in- 
digenous firms receive when they export to advanced country  market^.^ 
Much of the dynamic growth in the East Asian region has been ascribed 
to the spillover benefits allegedly received by  East Asian firms through 
3. See the section of Porter (1990) entitled “Tapping Selective Advantages in Other Na- 
tions” (606-13). 
4. The emphasis placed by  this literature on exports differs from that of  the literature 
described in the previous paragraph, which emphasizes the role of  imports as a channel of 
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 export^.^  In fact,  several well-executed  microeconometric studies have 
found essentially no link between productivity growth at the firm level and 
the percentage of firm output that is exportedS6  However, many of these 
papers have not introduced an explicit channel whereby exporting might 
lead to higher levels of knowledge spillover. This paper introduces such a 
channel and explicitly tests its significance. 
Thus this paper attempts to fill the gap in the literature by investigating 
the extent to which the stocks of foreign investment of Japanese firms in 
the United States are correlated with increased capacity to obtain useful 
technological spillovers from the research activities of US.-based firms. I 
also examine the extent to which Japanese firms’ levels of  exports to the 
U.S. market are correlated with increased capacity to obtain such spill- 
overs from U.S. firms. To that end, I use microlevel data on the technologi- 
cal activities of Japanese firms, their FDI activities in the United States, 
and their exports to the U.S. market. The paper presents estimates of the 
impact of FDI on the R&D spillovers that these Japanese firms receive 
from U.S. firms. I find that firms with large stocks of FDI do tend to ob- 
tain slightly greater benefits from research conducted in the United States. 
However, this effect, while quite robust, is also small in magnitude. On the 
other hand, I find a much stronger relationship (in terms of magnitude 
of  the estimated coefficients) between knowledge spillovers and higher 
levels of exports to the U.S. market, though these effects are less robust. 
I conclude with a number of caveats concerning these results and some 
suggestions for further research. 
4.2  Prior Literature 
The Japanese surge in FDI after  1985 has attracted  the attention  of 
economists, and a large number of well-executed studies have  appeared 
in the literature. Studies have tended to focus on three different sets of 
questions. The first is as follows: What determines when and where Japa- 
nese firms invest? Important contributions to the resolution of this ques- 
tion in the English-language  literature include the work of Caves (1 993) and 
Drake and Caves (1992) at the industry level and of  Kyoji  Fukao et al. 
(1994) and Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996) at the firm level. Eaton and 
Tamura (1996) presented an interesting study using Japanese and U.S. 
data at the aggregate 
The second set of questions addressed by the literature is this: What are 
the effects of Japanese firm FDI on the host country and host country 
5. See, e.g., chap. 6 of the World Bank (1993) study The East Asian Miracle, particularly 
6.  These studies include Bernard and Jensen (1999), Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), 
7. There are, of course, many other interesting studies that I do not have time or space 
the section “How Manufactured Exports Increased Productivity.” 
and Aw,  Chen, and Roberts (1997). 
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firms in the targeted industry? One can make the argument that inward 
FDI allows the transfer to the host country of firm-specific intangible as- 
sets, including the “knowledge capital” of the firm, that might not be avail- 
able through arm’s-length market transactions such as licensing or exports 
and imports of  goods embodying firm-specific knowledge capital. It is 
further believed that the impact of  this technology transfer may  spread 
beyond the multinational subsidiary, diffusing to local indigenous produc- 
ers. Tax concessions for multinationals and other policies designed to at- 
tract foreign investment seem to be  predicated on this belief.* However, 
past empirical analyses of FDI at the firm level have generally failed to 
find any strong statistical relations at the micro level between FDI or tie- 
ups to foreign firms and productivity growth of  indigenous firms at the 
firm or plant level9 Rather, the evidence suggests that the positive effect 
of the presence of FDI comes through its impact on domestic competition, 
raising the allocative efficiency of the host country industry by driving out 
less efficient producers.’O 
This paper focuses on a different question: What are the effects of Japa- 
nese firm FDI on the honsha-that  is, the impact on the operations of the 
parent firm in Japan? Again, the most important contributions to this line 
of research have come from Japan, where there is widespread concern that 
Japanese firms are substituting foreign for domestic production, lowering 
the demand for domestic production workers. To get at this issue most di- 
rectly, a number of papers have focused on the extent to which FDI substi- 
tutes for or, alternatively, complements exports from the parent firm. I do 
not have space to review all of the papers that deserve mention, but I will 
note a few that are most relevant to the research conducted in this paper. 
One of the most provocative contributions is by Fukao and Toru (1995). 
These authors found  strong substitution  effects between domestic and 
foreign production  labor. These findings are corroborated  by  Blonigen 
(1996), but not by  Head and Ries (1997). As far as I know, no one has 
8. E.g., China’s regulatory regime for FDI heavily favors multinationals who bring in “ad- 
vanced technology.” 
9. The papers to which I  am referring here do not focus exclusively on FDI by Japanese 
firms. Some of the best known work along these lines are papers by Columbia University 
economist Ann Harrison and a group of coauthors that fail to find evidence at the firm level 
of technology spillovers from the local subsidiaries of multinationals to indigenous produc- 
ers in either Morocco or Venezuela. See Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Aitken and Har- 
rison (1999). On the other hand, the survey by  Blomstrom and Kokko (1996) cited studies 
at the industry level that do suggest the existence of such spillover effects. Aitken, Hanson, 
and Harrison (1997) find evidence of indigenous firms learning about export opportunities 
from the local affiliates of multinational firms, but this can be distinguished from flows of 
technology, per se. 
10. Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung (1996) studied the productivity impact of Japanese FDI 
in the North American auto component industry. They found that US.  parts suppliers with 
links to Japanese assembly plants actually registered lower rates of productivity growth than 
unaffiliated parts suppliers in the 1980s. Their evidence suggests that Japanese FDI did have 
a positive effect on productivity in the American industry but that this effect was almost 
entirely due to the increased competition the Japanese plants brought to the U.S. market. 118  Lee Branstetter 
analyzed at the firm level the impact of FDI on the ability of parent firms 
to “learn from” R&D conducted abroad. However, previous papers in the 
literature on Japanese FDI provide some indirect evidence on the impor- 
tance of technology acquisition as a motive for Japanese FDI. A number of 
empirical studies, including those of Kogut and Chang (1991, 1996),  Yama- 
waki (1 99 l), and Blonigen (1 997) have all found that Japanese U.S. acquisi- 
tions, in particular, are motivated by the desire to access technology.” 
Almeida (1996) undertook  research that bears some similarity to the 
work conducted in this paper.I2  He examined the patterns of citations of 
patents produced by U.S.-based subsidiaries of foreign multinational firms 
in the semiconductor industry. Almeida found that the patents generated 
by  these subsidiaries cite other local patents more intensively than does a 
control group of “domestic” patents. He also found that the patents gener- 
ated by  these subsidiaries are cited more intensively by  other local firms 
than are the control group. However, this study said nothing about how 
the presence of a subsidiary affects the research operations of  the parent 
jirm. This is  an important omission because, even  in high-tech sectors, 
multinationals tend to conduct the overwhelming majority of their total 
R&D effort in the home country. The innovative activities of foreign sub- 
sidiaries are only a small part of  total firm R&D effort. An  additional 
shortcoming of Almeida’s research is that it was based on an analysis of 
only 114 patents generated by the subsidiaries of only twenty-two firms in 
a single industry. To  put these numbers in perspective,  since the early 
1980s Hitachi Seisakushou (Hitachi Ltd.) has received more than six times 
as many patent grants in the United States as that 114 patent sample every 
single year. 
This paper, then, takes a first look at the impact of FDI on the parent 
firms’ ability to benefit from R&D undertaken abroad. It complements 
this analysis with a similar investigation of the relationship between ex- 
ports to the U.S.  market and the ability to receive R&D spillovers. In order 
to conduct such a study, one first has to establish an empirical framework 
for measuring R&D spillovers. This framework, based on work by  Jaffe 
(1986), is developed below. 
4.3  Empirical Methodology 
4.3.1  A Framework for Measuring Knowledge Spillovers 
This section borrows heavily from Branstetter (forthcoming), which, in 
turn, builds on the methodologies suggested by  Zvi Griliches (1979) and 
11. Wesson (1998) also found evidence of the importance of  this motivation for FDI in 
12. I thank Mariko Sakakibara for bringing this paper to my attention. 
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first implemented by Adam Jaffe (1986). The typical firm conducts R&D 
in a number of technological fields simultaneously. Let firm i’s R&D pro- 
gram be described by the vector F: where 
and each of the k elements of F represents the firm’s research resources 
and expertise in the kth technological area.I3  We can infer from the num- 
ber of patents taken out in different technological areas what the distribu- 
tion of R&D investment and technological expertise across different tech- 
nical fields has been. In other words, by counting the number of patents 
held by  a firm in a narrowly defined technological field, we can obtain a 
quantitative measure of the firm’s level of technological expertise in that 
field.I4  Thus the F-vector provides us with a measure of the firm’s location 
in technology space. Over time, of course, a firm can change its location 
by  building technological expertise in new areas, but this takes time and 
the adjustment costs associated with this kind of change can be high. For 
this reason, I calculate for each firm in my sample a single location vector 
based on its patenting behavior over the entire sample period. 
Griliches and Jaffe have reasoned that R&D spillovers between firms 
should be proportional to the similarity of their research programs. Given 
that firms working on the same technologies will tend  to patent in the 
same technological areas, a measure  of technological proximity can be 
constructed from the F-vectors defined in equation (1). The “distance” in 
technology space between two firms i and j  can be approximated by  Ty, 
where Ty  is the uncentered correlation coefficient of the F-vectors of the 
two firms, or 
Other things being equal, firm i will receive more R&D spillovers from 
firm j  if  firm j  is doing a substantial amount of R&D. Firm i will  also 
receive more R&D spillovers if its research program is very similar to that 
of firmj. Thus the total potential pool of international R&D spillovers for 
a firm can be proxied by calculating the weighted sum of the R&D per- 
formed by  all other foreign-based firms with the “similarity coefficients” 
for each pair of firms, T,, used as weights. The potential international, or 
13. The k  areas represent  technological areas (based on the  technology classification 
scheme of the U.S. patent office) rather than industry classifications.  We do control for indus- 
try effects elsewhere, but here we aim to measure technologicalproximity rather than proxim- 
ity in a “product market” sense. 
14. Obviously, advances in some technological fields are more easily codified into and 
protected by  patents than advances in others. However, the F-vector can still function as a 
reasonable measure of “relative” position in technology space as long as the “ease of codifi- 
cation” varies across fields in a common way across firms. 120  Lee Branstetter 
“foreign,” spillover pool for the ith firm in the tth year is K,,,  where 
(3) 
Here Rj,  is the R&D spending of thejth firm (j  not equal to i) in the tth 
year and Tv is the similarity ~0efficient.l~  Similarly, the potential intra- 
national, or “domestic,” spillover pool is computed as 
(4) 
where, in this equation, R,, is the R&D performed in the tth year by firms 
based in the domestic country, again weighted by  the T,’s. Assume that 
innovation is a function of  own R&D and external knowledge. Then the 
“innovation production function” for the ith firm in the tth year is 
where 
Nil  =  RB, K  K 2 Bil , 
is a set of industry dummy variables and a multiplicative error term. Here 
the 6’s can be thought of as exogenous differences in the “technological 
opportunity” of c different industries. 
Taking the logs of both sides of equation (5) yields the following log- 
linear equation 
(7)  nrr  =  Przt  +  Ylkdrr  +  r2k,,  + c  6c4, +  El, 
C 
In equation (7),  nrt  is innovation, r,, is the firm’s own R&D investment, k,, 
is the domestic spillover pool, k,,  is the international spillover pool, the 
D’s  are dummy variables to control for differences in the propensity  to 
generate new knowledge across industries (indicated by  the subscript c), 
and E is an error term. The y  coefficients measure the “innovative output 
elasticity” of the domestic and international spillover poo1s.16 
Unfortunately, there are no direct measures of innovation. However, if 
15. Note that Tv is not indexed by  time because it is constructed from the time-invariant 
F-vectors. 
16. One might suppose that external R&D only enters into the knowledge production 
function with a long and variable lag. Unfortunately, due to the features of the data, the 
precise lag structure of external R&D is likely to be difficult to identify. However, it is worth 
noting that empirical research suggests that the time required for new innovation to “leak 
out” is quite short. Mansfield’s  celebrated 1985 paper found that 70 percent of new product 
innovations leak out within one year and only 17 percent take more than eighteen months. 
Caballero and Jaffe (1993) found that diffusion of new knowledge as measured by  patent 
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some fraction of new knowledge is patented, such that the number of new 
patents generated by  the ith firm is  an exponential function of  its new 
knowledge, as given by 
then the production of new knowledge can be proxied by  examining the 
generation of new patents.17  We take the logs of both sides of equation (8), 
and substituting into equation (7), we  get 
(9) 
where pi, is the log of the number of new patents and the other variables 
are as before, except for the error term, which is defined below.’* With this 
substitution, the interpretation of the coefficients on the D’s has changed. 
They now represent industry-level differences in the propensity to patent, 
which are a function of both the technological opportunity in the cth in- 
dustry, as in equation (6), and the usefulness of patents as a tool of appro- 
priation in the cth industry. It is  known that strong differences in both 
factors exist across industries. 
Note, however, that because of this substitution, the interpretation  of 
the y’s has also necessarily changed. We do not observe the “pure effects” 
of  knowledge spillovers on firm innovation because we  do not directly 
observe innovation. We  instead observe the effects of knowledge spillovers 
on economic manifestations of the firm’s innovation, its patents. If tech- 
nological rivalry with other firms is intense enough and the scope of intel- 
lectual property rights conferred by  patents is  broad enough, firms may 
sometimes find themselves competing for a limited pool of available pat- 
ents-a  patent race. For this reason, the positive technological externality 
of  other firms’ R&D is potentially confounded with a negative effect of 
other firms’ research due to competition.I9 Thus, if  actual flows of knowl- 
17. Note that this formulation allows for both industry and firm differences in the propen- 
sity to patent. This flexibility is important given the observed differences in patenting behav- 
ior across firms and industries. 
18. One advantage of using patents as an indicator of innovative output is the demon- 
strated immediate, tight link between R&D and patent generation. Survey evidence from the 
United States and Germany indicates that the time lag from initial conception of an idea to 
the filing of a patent application is about nine months (Scherer 1984)! Careful econometric 
evidence also suggests that the link between patenting and R&D is largely contemporaneous. 
On the other hand, the link between R&D and changes in revenue (and revenue-based mea- 
sures such as total factor productivity), which result from the successful introduction of new 
products, is subject to long, variable lags. 
19. To make this explicit, we can decompose the y’s in the following fashion: y = (an/ak) 
(kin) -  (ap/ak)(k/p).  In other words, the y’s  that we observe are the net result of two opposite 
effects-the  “true” positive technological externality of external knowledge on firm i’s inno- 
vation, anlak, and a negative “patent race effect,” ap/ak, in which the ith firm’s ability to 
patent new innovation is crowded out by the previous patenting of competitive firms. Adam 
Jaffe (1986) and others have also made this point. 122  Lee Branstetter 
edge are limited or weak and rivalry is strong, our estimates of the y’s may 
be negative even though the underlying knowledge externality is positive.*O 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to disentangle these two effects in the data, 
though my empirical results suggest that both are present.*’ 
In Branstetter (forthcoming), regressions along the lines of equation (9) 
were run for both U.S. and Japanese R&D-intensive firms. The somewhat 
surprising results of these regressions suggest that R&D spillovers are pri- 
marily an intranational phenomenon. Controlling for the presence of in- 
tranational R&D spillovers, I found little evidence of positive, significant 
international R&D spillovers. This result was robust to the use of data 
from either the United States or Japan and robust to changes in the func- 
tional form of the estimating equation. Similar results were obtained when 
an index of total factor productivity (levels) was used as the dependent 
variable. These results should be kept in mind in interpreting the empirical 
results presented  in this paper.  I find  that  in  this paper, the impact  of 
foreign spillovers tends to be “overwhelmed” by  the impact of domestic 
knowledge spillovers when both terms are included in the regression. This 
is consistent with my own earlier results and with other recent evidence 
on the geographic localization of knowledge spillovers.** 
However, these results should be interpreted as measuring the average 
“innovative output elasticities” of international and intranational R&D 
spillovers obtained by pooling data on both small and large corporations, 
some of which have substantial connections to markets and technological 
developments abroad through exports and FDI. Is it possible that the im- 
pact of international R&D spillovers is substantially higher for firms with 
a high level of exports to or FDI in the foreign market? It is ultimately 
this question that motivates the following empirical work in this paper. 
4.3.2  The Impact of FDI and Exports on 
International Knowledge Spillovers 
Because the effects of intranational R&D spillovers were found to so 
completely overwhelm the effects of international spillovers in  previous 
work, the following empirical work will focus on international spillovers. 
Beginning with an “innovation production function,” as in equation (7), 
20. This can arise because only a small fraction of the constructed spillover “pool’-all 
of which is presumed to be technologically relevant external R&D-actually  has a positive 
impact on the research output of the firm. 
21. See Jaffe (1986),  who found direct evidence of negative “competitive” externalities in 
a framework similar to the one used in this paper. 
22. Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996)  and Francis Narin (1995) attempted to measure the extent 
to which knowledge spillovers are intranational in  scope by  analyzing patterns of  patent 
citations and citations in the scientific  literature, respectively. Both studies found that innova- 
tors are much more likely to cite innovators located in the same country than one would 
expect given the distribution  of  scientific resources across countries, technological fields, 
and time. Goto and Nagata (1997) presented survey evidence that indicates Japanese R&D 
managers perceive other domestic firms to be more important sources of technology spill- 
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we  drop the intranational spillover variable to yield  the following log- 
linear equation: 
(10)  q, = Pi,  +  Y(FDI,)k,,  + c v?,  +  5,. 
Here R,,  is innovation, rt,  is the firm’s own R&D investment, k,,  is the po- 
tential foreign spillover pool, the D’s are dummy variables to control for 
differences in the propensity to generate new knowledge across industries 
(indicated by the subscript d),  and E is an error term. However, we hypoth- 
esize that the impact of international spillovers on innovative output, y, is 
an increasing function of the stock of FDI firm i has set up in the foreign 
market (y’(FD1J  > 0), such that Japanese firms with high levels of FDI 
enjoy a higher innovation output elasticity for a given level of potential 
knowledge spillovers. The reasoning behind this is straightforward: spill- 
overs are not automatic. To monitor and understand  other firms’ R&D 
can be a difficult task. It may be facilitated enormously by the geographi- 
cal proximity attained through FDI, through which the cost of accessing 
foreign firms’ knowledge assets is reduced. This increase in a firm’s ability 
to receive spillovers may  occur whether or not  the subsidiary is  set up 
explicitly or entirely for the purposes of following research trends in the 
United States, and it may occur whether or not the FDI by the Japanese 
firm takes the form of greenfield new investment or acquisition of existing 
U.S. firms. 
However, there  are  also both  theoretical  and  empirical reasons  for 
thinking that the spillover-enhancing  effects of acquisition FDI and green- 
field FDI are different. The possibility exists that Japanese firms establish- 
ing new production facilities abroad may have relatively little to learn from 
their U.S. counterparts, being more technologically advanced than these 
counterpart firms at the time they undertake the actual investment. On 
the other hand, empirical work by a number of authors has suggested that 
acquisition FDI is at least partly motivated by  the desire to obtain the 
technological assets of the purchased firms. In light of this, we break down 
Japanese FDI into acquisition FDI and greenfield FDI and present results 
based on total FDI as well as acquisition FDI only. Note that we are taking 
a broader view of the potential spillover benefits of acquisition than others 
have taken in this literature. We  hypothesize that by purchasing a firm in 
the United States, a Japanese firm not only acquires the proprietary knowl- 
edge assets of the purchased firm but is also able to use the acquisition to tap 
into the informal technological networks and knowledge-sharing relation- 
ships possessed by the research personnel of the acquired firm.23 
As in previous equations, we  substitute observed patents for unobserved 
innovation, so that we are left with 
23. Porter (1990) also stressed these “access” benefits as an important component of the 
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(1 1)  P,, =  Prt, +  Y(FDI,l)k,,  +  CV?d  + P,,. 
Again, we allow IJ. to contain an individual effect as well as a truly random 
error component. 
We  do not have enough degrees of  freedom to allow y to vary with 
either the number of subsidiaries in the United States or the number of 
employees in those subsidiaries. Instead, we  divide our sample into firms 
with a “substantial” FDI presence in the United States and firms without 
such a presence and allow the parameter y to vary across the two sub- 
samples. In practice, this is done by running a regression including an inter- 
action term in which the spillover term is multiplied by a dummy variable 
signifying whether the firm has “substantial” FDI in the United States. 
Thus we estimate 
(12)  A,  =  P,  +  P,r,  +  rok,,  +  YIk,,  *  fdi,, +  Cv?d  +  P,I 
which is the econometric analogue of equation (1 1). Here fdi is a dummy 
variable equal to one if  the firm has undertaken substantial FDI in the 
United States by year t, and zero ~therwise.~~ 
In a similar fashion, we  can allow the strength of the spillover term to 
vary with the level of exports by  firm  i to the U.S. market as well as the 
level of its FDI in the United States. In this paper, I use data on the per- 
centage of firm sales exported to the United States as the measure of “U.S. 
export intensity.” As in equation (12), I create an interaction term between 
this level of export intensity and the foreign spillover term. Here the mea- 
sure of export intensity  is a percentage  rather  than a dummy variable 
equal to one if  the export intensity is above some threshold  level. Thus 
I estimate 
d 
where exint is the measure of U.S. export intensity. This provides us with 
a crude but  potentially  useful framework  for comparing the spillover- 
enhancing effects of FDI with the comparable effects of 
Some attention needs to be devoted to the assumed properties of the 
24. FDI is measured as a cumulative count of either numbers of subsidiaries in the United 
States or number of US. employees. The FDI dummy variable is set equal to one if this 
cumulative count is in the upper quartile of all observations in the sample. I present results 
using measures based on both counts of subsidiaries and counts of employees. In results not 
reported in this paper, I also tried constructing an interaction term of the cumulative counts 
(of subsidiaries or employees) multiplied by  the foreign spillover term. I  obtained qualita- 
tively similar, but statistically slightly weaker, results with this alternative formulation. 
25. Note that there is no time subscript on the exint variable-we  will rely on data from 
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new error term. Allowing the propensity to patent to vary across firms in 
a way not correlated with the other regressors creates a systematic compo- 
nent to the error-an  individual effect, 5,  such that 
(14)  P,t  =  5, +  u,,  3 
where the u is assumed to be a normal i.i.d. disturbance. If 5,  is uncorre- 
lated with the right-hand-side regressors, then this effect can be estimated 
using the random-effects framework. 
One can imagine, though, that this individual effect in the propensity 
to patent may be correlated with a firm’s own research levels. If we assume 
unobservable but permanent differences in the productivity of firms’ re- 
search, owing perhaps to the unequal distribution of high-quality research 
personnel across firms, we can easily imagine that firms with high-quality 
research personnel will do more research and that this will lead to more 
patents. One can also imagine that more productive research teams might 
be  able to more effectively monitor research  developments outside the 
firm. More to the point, higher levels of research productivity might also 
lead firms to engage in more FDI. This could generate a spurious statisti- 
cal relationship between high levels of FDI and higher measured output 
elasticities of international  spillovers. In  this case, estimates are biased 
unless we  correct for the correlation between firm-specific research pro- 
ductivity and our other independent variables. We  can do this using a 
fixed-effects estimator.26  Results from both a random-effects specification 
and a fixed-effects specification are provided for our estimates of equa- 
tion (12). 
Unfortunately,  the fixed-effects approach may create problems  of its 
own. First of all, fixed-effects models effectively throw  away the cross- 
sectional dimension  of the data, obtaining identification  from changes 
within firms over time. In this data set, most of the variance is in the cross- 
sectional dimension, so the cost of the fixed-effects approach is quite high. 
Furthermore, to the extent that measurement error is present in the data, 
using fixed-effects models can actually exacerbate the measurement error 
bias, leading to a downward bias in all estimated coefficients. Our results, 
presented in the next section, suggest that such measurement error bias 
is pre~ent.~’ 
26. The obvious alternative would be some sort of instrumental variables approach. Unfor- 
tunately, the only instrumental variables available at the firm level are lagged values of the 
included variables. If research quality evolves slowly over time, these lagged values are likely 
to be no less endogenous than the variables for which we instrument. As for general method 
of moments “dynamic” panel estimators, which use lagged levels as instruments for current 
differences, Blundell and Bond (I  995), among others, have found that in short, moderately 
sized panels with autoregressive explanatory variables (such as my data set), these estimators 
can behave quite badly. 
27. The classic reference on this problem is Griliches and Hausman (1986). 126  Lee Branstetter 
4.4  Empirical Estimates of the Spillover-Augmenting  Impact 
of Foreign Direct Investment and Exports 
I  use  microdata  on  publicly  traded  high-technology manufacturing 
firms in the United States and Japan. Considerable anecdotal evidence sug- 
gests that Japanese firms are particularly good at monitoring R&D devel- 
opments abroad. In addition,  some of  these Japanese firms engaged in 
FDI on a large scale in the United States, at least some of which was ex- 
plicitly motivated by the desire to “tap into” sources of US. technological 
strength. Fortunately, there also exists broadly comparable, publicly avail- 
able data at the micro level on the innovative activities of publicly traded 
firms in both countries.28 
I chose to examine the five industries in the United States and Japan for 
which the average ratio of R&D to sales is highest, for the simple reason 
that one is less likely  to identify the sources and effects of  spillovers in 
industries with little technological innovation. Since I rely on patents both 
as indicators of  innovative activity and as a means of  locating firms in 
technology space, I restricted my sample to US. and Japanese firms with 
more than ten patents granted in the United States during my  initial sam- 
ple period, 1977-89.  Prior to 1985, the publicly available data on Japanese 
firm-level R&D spending are of uneven quality, with gaps and large jumps 
in the time series of individual firms. Thus, in most of  my  regressions, I 
am forced to further restrict the sample period to the years 1986-89. 
The Japanese panel consists of 208 firms from the chemical, machinery, 
electronics, transportation, and precision instrument manufacturing in- 
dustries. For each firm, we  have data by  year for the years 1986-89.  For 
each year, we  have the number of patents granted to these firms in the 
United States (classified by date of application), their R&D expenditures 
in that year, a domestic spillover term consisting of the weighted sum of 
external R&D performed by  technologically related Japanese firms com- 
puted for each year, and a foreign spillover term consisting of  external 
R&D performed by  technologically related US. firms.29  The FDI data, 
originally taken from volumes of  Japank Expanding  L! S. Manufacturing 
Presence, published by  the Japan Economic Institute (MacKnight 1987- 
91), include both cumulative counts of subsidiaries and numbers of US. 
28. Note that the data are further described in the data appendix. 
29. Here I use the U.S. patents of Japanese firms to locate them in technology space and 
to measure their innovation. The patent classification schemes and screening processes used 
in the two countries are different enough that, to ensure the comparability of patents for 
both sets of firms, I decided to use U.S. patents. It should be noted that Japanese firms are 
extremely aggressive about patenting their inventions in the United States as well as Japan. 
Japanese firms now account for about 25 percent of new patents in the United States, by far 
the most important foreign users of the American patent system. Finally, it is also true that 
detailed data on the Japanese patents held by these firms is difficult to obtain and extraordi- 
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Table 4.1  Sample Statistics for Japanese Firms with U.S. FDI 
Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Patents  95  179.3  0  966 
R&D‘  33,728.24  59,553.57  0  316,148 
R&D/sales  .046  .025  0  .I6 
U.S. employees  1,069  1,870.3  0  12,233 
aUnit  is millions of 1985 Japanese yen. 
Table 4.2  Sample Statistics for Japanese Firms without U.S. FDI 
Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Patents  I1  26  0  386 
R&D“  4,844.65  7,969.15  100  82,152.65 
R&D/sales  ,043  .030  .002  .I6 
*Unit is millions of 1985 Japanese yen. 
employees.30  Tables 4.1 and 4.2 give some summary statistics for the Japa- 
nese u ample.^' 
The foreign spillover term is based on firm-level data from a panel of 
209 U.S. firms in the same five industries covering the same years. The 
construction of this U.S.  data set is further described in the data appendix. 
Complete documentation of the data and original. sources can be found 
in Branstetter (1996). 
4.4.1  Sample Statistics 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that firms with FDI in the United States tend 
to be larger, obtain more patents, and have higher levels of R&D spending, 
both in absolute terms and as a percentage of sales.32  The difference in 
30. I am grateful to Thomas Pugel for providing me with these data in electronic form. 
31. The use of U.S. patents to infer the R&D activities of Japanese firms raises the possibil- 
ity that I am systematically undermeasuring Japanese research productivity. To  the extent 
that the Japanese patent  only a fraction  of  their inventions in the United States but this 
fraction is constant across firms and across time, it will fall into the constant term (since I 
estimate separate knowledge production functions for U.S. and Japanese firms). To the extent 
that it is constant across firms but not across time, it will fall out in the time dummies. To 
the extent that it is not constant across firms but is constant across time, this differential will 
be absorbed into the fixed effect. In the absence of more detailed information  about the 
Japanese patents of Japanese firms, little more can be said on this issue, though I acknowl- 
edge that it may cloud my interpretation of the empirical results. 
32. I note here that FDI is measured as a “cumulative” count of both subsidiaries and 
U.S. employees. Firms with a “significant presence” are those that obtain a level in the upper 
quartile of total observations. A number of firms moved from positions of no U.S. FDI to 
significant amounts over the course of the sample period, so there is substantial time varia- 
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patenting is especially pronounced. In addition, not surprisingly, industry 
mix differs across the two subsamples, though this is not shown in the 
tables. Because the two groups of firms differ in many ways  other than 
their levels of FDI, it may be necessary to use a fixed-effects approach in 
order to avoid erroneously attributing differences in the impact of  spill- 
overs to FDI because of omitted-variables bias. 
4.4.2  Regressions Using Total Foreign Direct Investment 
Table 4.3 gives the results of a number of alternative specifications of 
equation (12), where FDI is measured as the sum of greenfield investment, 
joint ventures, and acquisitions. The first two columns of table 4.3 show 
the results of OLS regressions on own R&D, the foreign spillover term, 
and the interaction term of the FDI dummy variable together with the 
foreign spillover term.)’ The first column gives results from a regression 
run without time dummies. The second column includes time dummies. 
The results, which are essentially confirmed in all other specifications, in- 
dicate that possession of an “FDI presence” in the United  States does 
increase the innovative output of foreign spillovers, but only by  a small 
amount. The coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, so the reported 
numbers imply that if the amount of foreign spillovers were to increase by 
10 percent, the innovative output of Japanese firms would go up by  2 
percent, but the additional impact obtained by Japanese firms with a sub- 
stantial FDI presence would only be 0.4 percent. 
The third and fourth columns of table 4.3 illustrate the results from a 
random-effects specification. The coefficient on the fdi/foreign-spillover 
interaction  term  remains  essentially unchanged  in  both  columns.  The 
fourth column reveals, however, that the estimated impact of foreign spill- 
overs is quite sensitive to the inclusion of a domestic spillover term. When 
domestic  spillovers are controlled  for, the estimated  coefficient on the 
overall foreign spillover term becomes negative, though it also is no longer 
statistically significant at the traditional 5 percent level. However, the fdi/ 
foreign-spillover interaction term remains positive and significant. 
Given our earlier concerns about the likelihood of firm-specific differ- 
ences in research productivity, however, it may be that the random-effects 
coefficients are affected by the omitted-variables bias arising from the cor- 
relation of this unmeasured firm-specific research productivity with R&D 
inputs, innovative outputs, and FDI. If we assume that these firm-specific 
variables change slowly over time-so  slowly that they can be assumed to 
be fixed over the 1986-89  four-year span of our data-then  fixed-effects 
models will  yield consistent estimates. Unfortunately, to the extent that 
33. In these regressions, the foreign spillover term is lagged one period, partly to control 
for differences in fiscal years between U.S. and Japanese firms and partly to allow foreign 
knowledge more time to spill over. Foreign Direct Investment and R&D Spillovers  129 
Table 4.3  Linear Regressions Based on Total Japanese FDI Data Measured by  Counts of 
US. Subsidiaries 
Random  Random  Fixed  Fixed 
OLS  OLS  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects 
Variable  (Foreign)  (Foreign)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
log R&D 
log Domestic spillovers 
log Foreign spillovers 
log Foreign 
















-  ,2959 
(.  1597) 
-.5347 
(.  1522) 








(.  1501) 




-  ,6964 
(.1525) 





-  .0071 
-  .0405 
,5842  .5544 
(.0435)  (.0436) 
1.074 
(.2702) 
,3991  -.5341 
(.1695)  (.2868) 
,0309  .0311 
(.0058)  (.0057) 
-.6410  -  ,2488 
(.2732)  (.2857) 
(.2911)  (.2865) 
(.2784)  (.2735) 
(.2896)  (.2847) 
-.0534  ,0879 
(.1054)  (.0572) 
,0365  ,0422 
(.1028)  (.0544) 
.0648  -.0632 
(.1025)  (.0593) 
~  ,2923  -  .2004 
-  ,5234  -.5762 
~  ,6567  -.5855 
,1315  ,1292 
(.0894)  (.0893) 
,5353 
(.3282) 
,7755  ,2126 
(.3196)  (.4701) 
,0225  ,0220 
(.0064)  (.0064) 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
Nore: Dependent variable is the log of the number of patents. N  = 832. Numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. 
measurement error is present in the data, using a fixed-effects model could 
actually exacerbate the measurement error bias. 
The fifth and sixth columns reveal the results obtained when one uses 
fixed-effects models. It is noted that the magnitude and significance of the 
own R&D term drops substantially, suggesting that measurement error is 
indeed present and the resulting bias is considerably worsened by using the 
fixed-effects approach. Again, the estimated impact of the foreign spillover 
term is quite sensitive to inclusion of domestic spillovers. When domestic 
spillovers are controlled for in the fixed-effects specifications, the over- 
all foreign spillover term is no longer significant. However, the fdi/foreign- 
spillover interaction term remains positive and significant in all specifica- 
tions. 
4.4.3  The Negative Binomial Estimator 
Linear estimators have the two considerable advantages of ease of esti- 
mation and interpretation  and relative robustness to misspecification of 130  Lee Branstetter 
Table 4.4  Negative Binomial Model Based on Total Japanese FDI Data 
Measured by Counts of US.  Subsidiaries 
Variable  Negative Binomial 
log R&D 
log Domestic spillovers 
log Foreign spillovers 



























Note: Dependent variable is the number of patents. N = 832. The negative binomial regres- 
sions follow Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984). Numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors, computed from the analytic second derivatives. 
the  nature  of  the  error  term.  However,  patent  data  are  intrinsically 
“count” data, for which the normal distribution is likely to be an inappro- 
priate appr~ximation.~~  Over the past ten years, econometricians have de- 
veloped a number of count data models to deal with such data. Among 
the most commonly used is the negative binomial estimator. The negative 
binomial estimator is a generalization of the familiar Poisson estimator.35 
Provided the assumption that the error term follows a negative binomial 
distribution is met, consistent estimates of the parameters of interest can 
be  obtained  through maximum likelihood estimation. Of  course, if  the 
distributional  assumption is  incorrect, then  consistency is  not assured, 
even in theory. Therefore, evidence from a negative binomial regression is 
offered in table 4.4 as a reality check on the linear results rather than as a 
superior alternative to linear estimation. 
34. An additional problem arises from the fact that some Japanese firms take out no pat- 
ents in some years-and  the log of zero is undefined. In this analysis, this problem is ad- 
dressed by  simply setting the dependent variable equal to zero in such cases. Concerns that 
this transformation might affect results constitute an additional reason for using the negative 
binomial specification as a “robustness” check. 
35. See Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) for a derivation of these models and a discus- 
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Fortunately, the results broadly corroborate those of the linear models. 
In this specification, as in others, there is no evidence of positive, signifi- 
cant foreign spillovers overall, but the fdilforeign-spillover interaction term 
remains positive and significant. 
4.4.4  Results from Acquisition Foreign Direct Investment 
and Other Robustness Checks 
A number of theoretical and empirical papers on Japanese FDI have sug- 
gested the importance of  breaking down Japanese FDI by  category into 
greenfield investment and acquisition FDI. It has been suggested by some 
authors, including Blonigen (1997), that greenfield investment is likely to 
be motivated by the technological strengths of the investing Japanese firms 
rather than the relative technological strengths of the US.-based competi- 
tors. In fact, one could make a loose, heuristic argument on the basis of 
internalization theory that Japanese firms would be motivated to under- 
take the most greenfield FDI precisely where their U.S. counterparts were 
technologically weakest, in a relative sense. Therefore, there is little rele- 
vant technological innovation that could be expected to spill over to the 
more advanced Japanese firms. 
On the other hand, as we  have mentioned previously, there is some evi- 
dence that acquisition FDI is at least partly motivated by the desire to tap 
into sources of  US. relative technological strength. For that reason, we 
constructed alternative measures of Japanese FDI using only data on ac- 
quired subsidiaries. The results of linear regressions using these data are 
given in table 4.5. 
The layout of this table is similar to that of table 4.3, and the empirical 
Table 4.5  Linear Regressions Based on Japanese Acquisition FDI Data Measured by Counts 
of US.  Subsidiaries 
Random  Random  Fixed  Fixed 
OLS  OLS  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
log R&D  ,7280  ,7288  ,6092  .5808  ,1461  .I429 
(.0277)  (.0279)  (.0437)  (.0437)  (.0902)  (.0901) 
log Domestic spillovers  1.057  ,5146 
(.2755)  (.  3  304) 
log Foreign spillovers  ,2510  ,2474  ,4336  -.4831  ,8807  .3448 
(.0967)  (.0978)  (.1733)  (.2925)  (.3175)  (.4679) 
log Foreign  .0235  ,0230  ,0249  ,0244  .0199  ,0189 
spillovers *fdi  (.0067)  (.0068)  (.0064)  (.0064)  (.0070)  (.0071) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  n.a.  n.a. 
Time dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Note: Dependent variable is the log of the number of patents. N  = 832. Numbers in parentheses are 
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Table 4.6  Negative Binomial Model Based on Japanese Acquisition FDI Data 
Measured by  Counts of US. Subsidiaries 
Variable  Negative Binomial 
log R&D 
log Domestic spillovers 
log Foreign spillovers 















,921  1 
-3,000.1 
Note: Dependent variable is the number of patents. N  = 832. Numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. 
specifications are the same. By and large, the results are qualitatively iden- 
tical to those in table 4.3, although the impact of acquisition FDI seems 
slightly smaller in estimated elasticity terms. The first two columns show 
the results of OLS regressions of patent output on own R&D, foreign spill- 
overs, the interaction term, and industry dummies, with and without time 
dummies. The second two columns give the results of the random-effects 
models. Again, the foreign spillover term is quite sensitive to the inclusion 
of information on domestic spillovers, whereas the fdi/foreign-spillover 
term remains quite robust to it. Finally, the fixed-effects models demon- 
strate the same patterns as the fixed-effects models of table 4.3. 
Table 4.6 gives the results of a negative binomial regression using the 
acquisition FDI data. As the reader can easily see, here too the results 
are broadly consistent with those obtained from the negative binomial 
specification that employed total FDI numbers. However, the estimated 
impact of FDI on spillovers is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Finally, table 4.7 gives the results of linear regressions using total 
FDI data where the FDI variable is based on numbers of U.S. employees 
rather than counts of sub~idiaries.)~  The results are quite similar to those 
obtained using counts of subsidiaries as the measure of FDI. 
36. Again, the FDI variable is a dummy variable, but here it is set equal to one where a 
firm lies in the upper quartile in terms of its number 0TU.S. employees rather than its number 
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Table 4.7  Linear Regressions Based on Japanese Total FDI Data Measured by 
Total Number of U.S. Employees 
Variable 
Random  Fixed  Fixed 
OLS  Effects  Effects  Effects 
(2)  (1)  (1)  (2) 
~  ~~ 
log R&D  ,6760 
(.0297) 
log Domestic spillovers 
log Foreign spillovers  ,2385 
log Foreign spillovers*fdi  ,0395 
Industry dummies  Yes 












.1542  ,1514 
(.0904)  (.0903) 
,5654 
(.3289) 
,8740  ,2747 
(.3  166)  (.47 1  0) 
.0221  ,0217 
(.0074)  (.0075) 
n.a.  n.a. 
No  No 
Note: Dependent variable is the log of the number of patents. N = 832. Numbers in paren- 
theses are standard errors. 
4.4.5  The Impact of Export Intensity versus Foreign Direct 
Investment on Knowledge Spillovers 
In this subsection, we present the results of a preliminary investigation 
of the impact of export intensity on a firm’s ability to absorb R&D spill- 
overs from US. firms. This effect is compared to that obtained from FDI. 
Our analysis here is limited by the fact that data at the firm level on exports 
broken down by region of export destination are only available for a sub- 
sample of our firms.37  These data are taken from reports filed by Japanese 
firms that are listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and they are currently 
only available for firms in the electronics sector.38  Furthermore, these data 
record export levels in the year 1992. 
In the regressions, shown in table 4.8, we create an interaction term in 
which our international spillover measure is multiplied by the percentage 
of  total sales of  the company that was exported to the U.S. market in 
1992, as we specified in equation (13). We are implicitly assuming that this 
percentage of sales exported to the United States in 1992 is a reasonable 
proxy for the company’s exports to the United States in the years of our 
sample period, 1986-89.  To the extent that this assumption fails to hold, 
our export/spillover interaction term is measured with error. 
In table 4.8, we  run a number of versions of equation (13), using both 
OLS and random-effects regressions. The results are not robust to the use 
of fixed effects. Given the small sample size used in this regression, that 
37. I thank Renk Belderbos for generously providing me these data in electronic form. 
38. The data are originally taken from the Yuku Shouken Hokokushou filed by  individual 
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Table 4.8  Exports versus FDJ as Channels of R&D Spillovers 
Variable 
Random  Random  Random 
OLS  Effects  Effects  Effects 







log Foreign spillovers  -.229 
log Foreign spillovers from FDI 
log Foreign spillovers from exporting 















,588  .503 
(.101)  (.043) 
-  ,947 
(.649) 
,077  .030 
(.013)  (.006) 
,130  .359 
(.160)  (.072) 
1.59  ,545 
(.763)  (.152) 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
Nore: Dependent variable is the log of the number of patents. N  = 188. Numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. 
result does not  surprise us. In future research, with a larger sample of 
firms with both export and FDI data, we expect to find more robust results 
of the impact of export intensity on spillovers. As can be clearly seen from 
these  preliminary  results,  in  all  cases  the  coefficient  on  the  export- 
intensity/spillover interaction term is quite large relative to that of the fdi/ 
spillover interaction term. Of course, in the form in which they are given 
in table 4.8, the two sets of coefficients are not strictly comparable. How- 
ever, the estimated export-intensity/spillover  interaction terms imply that 
evaluated at the mean of  the data, the elasticity of patent output with 
respect to the foreign knowledge spillover term increases by 2 to 5 percent- 
age points for every percentage point increase in U.S.  export intensity. This 
suggests that exports may be a more important channel of R&D spillover 
than is FDI for Japanese firms.39  Alternatively, one can argue that having 
already achieved a high degree of “contact” with the U.S. market, Japa- 
nese firms found little additional value in terms of  increased “spillover 
absorption capacity” from their US. foreign investments. 
4.5  Conclusions and Extensions 
The primary results of the regressions undertaken in this paper can be 
simply stated. Having an FDI presence in the United States seems to aug- 
ment the R&D spillovers Japanese firms are able to obtain from the re- 
search efforts of U.S. firms. However, the estimated effects, while quite 
39. This needs to be tempered with the observation that the construction of the two inter- 
action terms differs. Thus some care must be taken in the interpretation of these coefficients. Foreign Direct Investment and R&D Spillovers  135 
robust to alternative empirical specifications and alternative measures of 
FDI, tend to be  quite small. In particular, they do not seem to be large 
enough  to provide evidence in  favor of  the alarmist  position  of  some 
American observers that Japanese firms have been able to secure competi- 
tive advantages by tapping into U.S. technological strengths. Instead, the 
evidence presented in this paper suggests that even those Japanese firms 
with a comparatively large stock of FDI in the United States tend to learn 
more from other Japanese firms than they do from their U.S. counterparts. 
The much more preliminary results presented here on the impact of 
exports suggest that firms with high levels of exports to the U.S. market 
seem to receive more in the way of knowledge spillovers than firms with- 
out such high levels of exports. These results are based on information 
from a much smaller sample drawn from a single industry. Nevertheless, 
they could help us to interpret the results in the previous paragraph. It 
may  be that Japanese firms were already well  aware of  developments in 
U.S. markets through their extensive exports to the United States. The 
additional learning obtained through actual establishment of manufactur- 
ing facilities may have contributed little to a level of sophistication con- 
cerning U.S.  markets that  was already high by  the time the investment 
wave began in the late 1980s."" Redoing the export regressions with a larger 
data sample is the subject of current research. 
Of course, all of these results need to be assessed in light of a number 
of important caveats. First, I do not possess R&D and patenting data on 
all Japanese firms that engaged in substantial FDI in the United States. 
To the extent that the missing Japanese investors were able to obtain sub- 
stantially greater spillover benefits than the firms in my data set, I may be 
systematically undermeasuring the effects. I am currently gathering data 
in order to expand the cross-sectional dimension of this data set and hope 
to include that data in future work. Second, the data on foreign spillovers 
come from a panel of  large U.S.  R&D-performing firms, not the firms 
wholly acquired by Japanese purchasers. It is possible that acquiring Japa- 
nese firms obtained substantial benefits from their acquisitions but that 
the more indirect spillover-enhancing benefits I am looking for were not 
present. In principle, data on the patent portfolios and R&D spending of 
firms that were publicly traded prior to their acquisition by Japanese firms 
could be obtained from Compustat and other sources. I hope to investi- 
gate this possibility in future research. Third, the data series used in this 
paper ends in 1989, the year in which investment peaked. It is reasonable 
to think that the spillover benefits from investment or acquisition may not 
begin to affect the parent firm's innovative activity until several years after 
the investment or acquisition. If this is the case, then my  time-series di- 
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mension may be too short to capture the impact of the data. I am currently 
gathering data that will allow me to extend this analysis through the mid- 
1990s. 
Of course, any extension of the data series into the 1990s will  have to 
deal with the effects of the Heisei recession, which may swamp any of the 
positive effects of FDI on domestic innovation. As an additional caveat, 
it may be that the spillover-augmenting  benefits obtained through foreign 
production  plants  are small, but  the  spillover-augmenting benefits ob- 
tained through research centers set up in other countries might be quite 
substantial. In the 1990s, leading Japanese corporations set up research 
centers in Silicon Valley and other areas expressly for the purpose of more 
closely following research trends in American high-technology industries. 
1 am currently attempting to obtain data on these research subsidiaries in 
order to separate out their effects in future re~earch.~’ 
A number of extensions could be made to the work presented here. One 
particularly useful extension would be to use  a more direct measure of 
knowledge spillovers. While Jaffe’s (1986) framework has a number of de- 
sirable and useful features, spillovers are inferred rather than measured 
directly. In principle, it is possible to measure knowledge spillovers directly 
by  observing the extent to which the patents of Japanese firms cite the 
patents of U.S.  firms, both those they have acquired and those that remain 
independent  competitor^.^^ If we  find that Japanese firms with a substan- 
tial FDI presence cite U.S. patents more frequently, this would be far more 
direct evidence of “spillover augmentation through FDI” than could be 
possibly obtained through the use of Jaffe’s (1986) framework. I hope to 
pursue this alternative approach in future work. 
An important omission in this paper was any consideration of the ex- 
tent to which Japanese FDI served as a means by which technology spill- 
overs flowed from Japanese firms to indigenous U.S. producers. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this effect may  have been important in the auto 
industry, though empirical research has not given strong support to this 
view. In principle, the data and the empirical techniques used in this paper 
could be used to investigate this point. I hope to explore this question in 
future work as well. 
Many countries and some subnational regions are actively soliciting for- 
eign investment, offering tax incentives and other economic inducements, 
often in search of spillover benefits of technology from foreign investors. 
However, the real extent to which FDI functions as a channel of technol- 
ogy spillovers, either from investor to the host country or from host coun- 
try firms back to the parent company of  the investor, remains undeter- 
41. R&D affiliates established abroad are the subject of  a recent  study by  Kuemmerle 
42. Analysis of knowledge spillovers using patent citations was undertaken by  Jaffe and 
(1  997). 
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mined. In spite of the formidable measurement challenges, it is important 
that economists attempt to quantify these benefits. I hope that this paper 
might stimulate other economists to use the kinds of data and the empiri- 
cal techniques employed here to attempt to answer these extremely impor- 
tant questions. 
Data Appendix 
Data on U.S. firm sales, capital stock, R&D spending, and other factors 
were taken from the NBER Productivity Data Base created by Bronwyn 
Hall and others. Documentation for the NBER database is available on- 
line or in written form, and I will not reproduce it here. The patent data 
for U.S. firms were collected in the same manner as that for Japanese firms, 
which is described below.  I identified the subsidiaries of the U.S. firms in 
my  database using multiple editions of the Directory of  Corporate Afilia- 
tions. 
Data on Japanese firm sales, capital stock, employment, and other in- 
puts were  taken from the Japan Development Bank Corporate Finance 
Data Base. This proprietary  database, collected and maintained by  the 
Japan Development Bank, is an extremely rich firm-level panel data set 
containing information on hundreds of  variables for thousands of firms 
from all sectors of the Japanese economy, Due to the well-known problems 
of output and productivity measurement in many service sector industries 
as well as the fact that most private R&D is concentrated in the manufac- 
turing sector in both the United States and Japan, I chose to focus solely 
on manufacturing firms. 
Data on Japanese R&D spending are taken from Japanese-language pri- 
mary sources, namely, the Kaisha Shiki Ho, published by Toyo Keizai, and 
the Nikkei Kaisha Joho, published by the Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha. Both 
are quarterly published books of  statistics on Japanese publicly  traded 
firms. Responding to interest in  the investor community in  the  R&D 
spending of  Japanese firms, both books began publishing the results of 
annual surveys on R&D spending, in the early 1980s and late 1970s, re- 
spectively. Response to the surveys is voluntary, so coverage varies from 
year to year. Furthermore, firms are not legally required to submit pre- 
cisely accurate figures when  they do choose to  respond.  Nevertheless, 
knowledgeable Japanese sources contend that these books do provide rea- 
sonably accurate information. 
Data on the U.S. patents of Japanese firms were obtained in electronic 
form from the U.S. Patent Office. Patents were obtained using the CASSIS 
CD-ROM. These patents were later reclassified by date of application, us- 
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to the other microdata firm by  firm, since patents are classified by  the 
English name of the Japanese firm (and occasionally the English translit- 
eration of  the Japanese name) or by  that of one of its subsidiaries, while 
my  other data are classified by the Tokyo Stock Exchange code, which is 
the Japanese equivalent of the Compustat code. In identifying subsidiar- 
ies, I relied on the information from Kigyo Keiretsu Soran, published by 
Toyo Keizai, as well as the source Kigyo Keiretsu to Gyokai Chizu and the 
book Industrial Groups in Japan, published by Dodwell Marketing Consul- 
tants. The problem of  matching patents to firms was simplified since a 
number of large research-intensive subsidiary firms were listed separately 
in my  relatively disaggregated data. 
Data on Japanese FDI in the United States were graciously provided to 
me in electronic form by Thomas A. Pugel of the Stern School of Business 
at New York University. The original source of Pugel’s data is the publica- 
tion Japan’s Expanding US.  Manufacturing Presence: 1990 Update, which 
was produced by the Japan Economic Institute. Despite its title, this book 
also provides some data on Japanese subsidiaries that were planned by 
1990 but not actually established until later. This source provides much 
useful data on Japanese subsidiaries, including the name of the Japanese 
parent firm, the address of  the subsidiary, the date of  establishment of 
the subsidiary, the number of  employees of  the subsidiary, and a brief 
description of the subsidiary’s primary busine~ses.~~  Unfortunately, infor- 
mation on all of these variables is not always available for all subsidiaries. 
Data on subsidiaries were matched to other data for Japanese companies 
based on the name of the firm. This matching was done using a computer 
algorithm that keyed in on fragments of firm names. Where necessary, the 
matching was corrected by  hand. As these data focus on Japanese direct 
investment in U.S. manufacturing, it is not a comprehensive data source. 
It is possible that some nonmanufacturing investments by Japanese manu- 
facturing firms were missed in these data. 
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(2): 107-43. 
Comment  Akiko Tamura 
In this paper, Branstetter presents a very interesting and powerful treat- 
ment of empirical facts that invites the reader to extend to other data sets 
or samples. 
The most interesting finding in this paper is that the effects of interna- 
tional R&D spillover are greater on the innovative output of Japanese 
firms with FDI in  the United States than for other Japanese firms. This 
can be seen clearly from the empirical results; the coefficient on the fdi/ 
foreign-spillover interaction term is significantly positive and very robust 
for all regressions. The coefficient estimate is surprisingly unchanged for 
all regressions except in table 4.6, which reports a much smaller number 
for the coefficient estimate in the negative binomial model based on Japa- 
nese acquisition FDI data. However, the amount of fdi/foreign-spillover 
impact is quite small; the coefficient estimates are around 0.02 to 0.04. 
The FDI function as a channel for spillovers is very important. In this 
paper, the technology spillovers from host country to parent  company, 
from U.S. firms to Japanese firms, is examined. I agree that this channel is 
significant in acquisition FDI cases. Japanese firms will purchase Ameri- 
can firms for the purpose of getting their technology. On the other hand, 
technology spillovers from investors to host country firms will be signifi- 
cant in greenfield FDI cases. When we  research Japanese FDI in other 
countries, especially East Asian countries, the channel of technology spill- 
overs from Japanese investor firms to host country firms is  considered 
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more essential. Thus technology spillover from Japanese firms to U.S. 
affiliate firms should be also examined when Japanese firms establish new 
production facilities in the United States. However, the impact of acquisi- 
tion FDI on foreign spillover is smaller than that of greenfield FDI, as 
can be seen by comparing the regression results in table 4.5 and table 4.3. 
It would  be  interesting to investigate why  the empirical results conflict 
with the above intuitive understanding of the differences between the roles 
of greenfield and acquisition FDI. 
It might also improve our understanding of the empirical results to con- 
sider domestic spillover and foreign spillover. When domestic spillovers 
enter the regressions, the coefficient of foreign spillover becomes negative 
or insignificant. This may suggest that domestic spillovers overwhelm for- 
eign spillovers. When the R&D spending patterns of Japanese firms and 
U.S. firms are very similar, domestic spillover and foreign spillover will be 
correlated and the multicollinearity will affect the regressions. 
I would like to comment on the use of data on the number of patents 
granted as the dependent variable. For reasons of  availability, the data 
consist of U.S. patents held by Japanese firms instead of Japanese patents. 
From the aggregate 1991 data supplied by the Japanese Patent Office, Jap- 
anese patents granted in Japan numbered 30,453,000 and Japanese patents 
granted in the United States numbered 21,027,000. These numbers are 
close enough to allow us to assume that Japanese firms patent most of 
their inventions in the United States as well as in Japan. 
However, it is possible that the number of patent applications would be 
a better measure of innovation than the number of patents granted. One 
reason why patent applications might present a clearer picture is the time 
lag between the invention and the granting of its patent. In addition, many 
Japanese patent  applications never request examination for a grant be- 
cause it is felt that the application already supplies some protection by 
simply having been submitted and does not need to be granted. According 
to data supplied by  the Japanese Patent Office (1994), only 9 percent of 
applications filed in 1991 requested examination for a grant by 1993. Some 
patent applications may be useless, but it is difficult to determine the qual- 
ity of patent applications. The number of Japanese patent applications in 
Japan, 335,933,000, is much larger than Japanese patent applications in 
the United States, 38,609,000. The number of Japanese patent applications 
is so large partly because Japanese patents contain fewer claims per patent. 
As the author mentioned in the paper, the differences between the Japa- 
nese and U.S. patent systems should be considered carefully. 
Branstetter  carefully  constructs  a  measure  of  knowledge  spillovers, 
which itself can be considered an excellent contribution of this paper. Al- 
though it will  be less impressive, I would like to present some facts con- 
cerning the relation between knowledge spillover and FDI from a much 
simpler, more straightforward perspective. If Japanese firms with FDI in Foreign Direct Investment and R&D Spillovers  143 
the United States cite U.S. patents more frequently, knowledge spillovers 
from the United States to Japan are augmented. Correspondingly, if  U.S. 
affiliates of Japanese firms license Japanese patents, the knowledge spill- 
over is from Japan to the United States. A survey by  Japan’s Science and 
Technology Agency (1997) reports on Japanese technology imports and 
exports, mostly giving the payment amounts from patent licensing, includ- 
ing initial payments and ongoing royalties. From the data for 1995, about 
30 percent of Japanese technology exports to the United States were di- 
rected toward affiliates. On the other hand, most Japanese technology im- 
ports, more than 95 percent, are from nonaffiliate firms. These surveys are 
much less complete than the data Branstetter has. However, the technol- 
ogy import data puzzle me a little in terms of technology transfer from 
U.S. affiliates to Japanese parent firms. (More complete data for Japanese 
technology exports and imports are available from Japan’s Management 
and Coordination Agency [1997], but the data do not show whether the 
firms exporthmport technology from affiliate or nonaffiliate firms.) 
Since Branstetter gets remarkable results from his empirical work, ex- 
tending his analytical tools to other data sets, such as data on Japanese 
firms with FDI in other countries, would be fascinating. Can the findings 
in this paper, the relations between technology spillover and FDI, apply 
to Japanese firms with FDI in East Asian countries? Collecting such data 
as Branstetter used in the paper would be extremely difficult, so we  may 
have to begin with industry-level aggregate data instead of data on individ- 
ual firms. 
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Comment  Mariko Sakakibara 
This paper begins by distinguishing between two types of FDI: the first is 
home-base-exploiting  FDI, based on the internalization theory first devel- 
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oped by Hymer (1960). In this type of FDI, the formation of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) is tied to the existence of firm-specific advantages, 
which  provide  these firms with  offsetting cost  advantages  and market 
power over foreign producers. Intangible assets such as sales and market- 
ing or technological resources are subject to market imperfections, and 
the creation of internal markets across national boundaries for the exploi- 
tation of these assets gives rise to MNEs (Caves 1971; Buckley and Casson 
1976). The second type of FDI is home-base-augmenting FDI, proposed 
by Porter (1990). In this type, the objective of FDI is to tap superior host 
country knowledge and learn from it. This distinction has been examined 
by Wesson (1993) and others. 
Based on this distinction, Branstetter intends to measure  the home- 
base-augmenting effect of FDI. Assumptions made here are that acquisi- 
tions might be a more effective means for home-base-augmenting FDI, 
while home-base-exploiting FDI is more likely to be conducted through 
greenfield investments. Branstetter finds that for both aggregate FDI and 
acquisition FDI, FDI-intensive firms benefit more from foreign spillovers. 
Though this effect is small, it is robust. In this analysis, foreign spillovers 
are measured as the sum of R&D efforts conducted by U.S. firms, weighted 
by the technological proximity to a “receiving” Japanese firm. 
I would like to pose a fundamental question: Why do Japanese firms 
want to learn from U.S. firms through acquisitions? Branstetter’s implicit 
assumption here, indicated by his construction of technological proximity 
measures, is that U. S. firms have more advanced technological knowledge 
in the same technological areas as the Japanese acquiring firms. This as- 
sumption might imply that technologically inferior firms want to acquire 
superior firms or, more realistically, larger firms want to acquire small 
but technologically competent firms. A more plausible and perhaps more 
prevalent scenario, however, is that U.S. firms have knowledge in different 
technological areas from Japanese acquiring firms. If this scenario is in- 
deed more prevalent, it is necessary to add another dimension to the an- 
alysis. 
The distinction between acquisition of a firm in the same business as 
the acquiring firm (the existing business case) and acquisition of a firm in 
a different business from the acquiring firm (the diversification case) pro- 
vides additional insight into the process of knowledge transfer through 
acquisitions. Table 4C. 1 illustrates the importance of this distinction. 
If  a  firm  possesses  a  firm-specific advantage  (i.e.,  the  home-base- 
exploiting FDI case), it may invest in a U.S. firm in the same business, as 
with the NKK-National  Steel acquisition, in order to utilize its expertise 
in its business. In this case of home-base-exploiting FDI, it is unlikely that 
a Japanese firm will invest in a different business unless it wants to conduct 
portfolio investment. 
On the other hand, in the case of home-base-augmenting FDI, Japanese Foreign Direct Investment and R&D Spillovers  145 
Table 4C.1 
FDI Type  Existing Business  Diversification 
Existing Business versus Diversification 
Home-base-augmenting FDI  Yamanouchi-Roberts  Pharmaceutical  Sony-Columbia Pictures 
(perhaps limited cases?)  Kubota-Akashic  Memories 
(hard disk drives) 
Home-base-exploiting FDI  NKK-National  Steel  0 
investment in the same business in the United States would be limited, as 
with Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical’s acquisition of a smaller pharmaceuti- 
cal firm. What might be more prevalent is acquisition for diversification, 
as with the Sony-Columbia Pictures case or the farm equipment company 
Kubota’s acquisition of  a hard disk drive company. In these cases, the 
Japanese firms will  learn R&D capabilities different from those they al- 
ready have, and so the technological distance between a Japanese firm and 
the US. spillover pool should be calculated as the distance between a U.S. 
subsidiary and the spillover pool it is tapping. Since Branstetter does not 
make a distinction between the existing business and diversification cases, 
technological distance is  measured from the Japanese headquarters  in 
both cases. This can be a source of measurement error. 
As for the small but robust effect of foreign spillovers on Japanese FDI- 
intensive firms, Branstetter interprets the presence of subsidiaries in the 
United States as contributing to the R&D productivity of a Japanese firm 
through learning. Given the possible measurement error explained above, 
this analysis might capture the effect that foreign presence brings firms 
greater revenue or profit; further, if  economies of scale in R&D are pres- 
ent, the greater R&D input will increase R&D productivity. If this is true, 
it is not a learning effect, as interpreted. 
My suggestion is to modify the current model to reflect the actual learn- 
ing process. Perhaps Branstetter can assign different weights to the dis- 
tance between a Japanese firm and the U.S. spillover pool by  the type of 
U.S.  subsidiary. Alternatively, he can use another measure of spillovers: 
patent citation, which might be a more direct measure of spillovers. 
There already exists a literature that measures the learning effect of FDI 
by using patent citations. Almeida (1996) examined the US. semiconduc- 
tor industry and found that foreign subsidiaries in the United States cite 
more local knowledge than would be expected given the geographic distri- 
bution of innovative activities and also cite more locally than U.S. firms. 
He also found evidence that foreign subsidiaries in the United States con- 
tribute to local knowledge; that is, foreign subsidiaries are cited more lo- 
cally than would be expected. Frost (1995) conducted a similar analysis 
for broader industries. 
In addition to the issue of the learning process, I would like to point 
out a minor issue. Branstetter deals with technological proximity between 146  Lee Branstetter 
Japanese and U.S. firms. There is  another proximity issue: geographical 
proximity in the United  States, or the geographical distance between a 
Japanese subsidiary and the U.S. spillover pool. This would be  a larger 
issue in the United States than in Japan, given the large size of the country. 
For example, if a Japanese firm wants to learn semiconductor technology, 
it will benefit more from establishing a subsidiary in Silicon Valley than in 
Kentucky. Different geographical locations of Japanese subsidiaries might 
have differential effects on learning. 
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